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RUTH P. MACK
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
IF 'rag Conference is conceived as asking whether regularization of
business investment can smooth out the business cycle, the conclu-
sion is certainly an unequivocal no. But the question asked was not
this one but rather: Can efforts toward the regularization of business
investment contribute materially to reduction in the amplitude of
business cycles? So viewed, the regularization of business invest-
ment is thought of as one of the many approaches to the problem
of economic stabilization.
Throughout the Conference the point was made implicitly that
the relationship between business action with respect to investment
and other stabilizing measures is a geometric, not an arithmetic, one.
It seems likely that for business action with respect to investment
to be effective, the business environment must be viewed as one
reasonably immune to grotesque alterations in employment. Simi-
larly, regularization through other methods is likely to be made
more feasible through the reduction of adverse secondary effects by
the material lessening of the cyclical variations of business in-
vestment.
In discussing the intricate questions of how investment regu-
larization could be attained, the Conference was plagued by am-
biguity of language. Woodward, in his summary, complained that
planning periods had been defined by various authors as ranging
all the way from a year to twenty years. Yet there need be no dis-
agreement in a range of this sort, for "planning period" can mean
the time for which funds have been irrevocably committed, funds
committed subject to recall, plans concretely formulated, or general
notions clarified as to directions of further expansion. Obviously
these increasingly vague "planning periods" will have increasing
durations. Another confusion lay in the distinction between long-
term and short-term capital investment and the motives that govern
each. This distinction most usually applied to the difference between
the period appropriate to the judgment of whether to undertake
the investment and the period appropriate to the decision when to
undertake it.
Whether or not the small or the large firmwasthe field of
maximum concern produced similar difficulties. The thought was
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tendered that business investment in small firms was more sensitive
to cycles than that in large firms (though Gonzalez produced one
small batch of evidence to the contrary), yet De Chazeau suggested
that the large firm would provide the most productive point of
departure. The apparent disagreement simply reflected a difference
in point of view. Whether or not the large firm needs to smooth
investment more than the small firm, it seems likely that it would be
simpler to start work at this point. For one thing, there are fewer
large firms and they are therefore easier to deal with. But more
important perhaps is the fact that many large firms in cyclically
variable industries have more to gain through smoothing the busi-
ness cycle than they have through capturing markets from their
competitors; they have therefore a greater relative financial stake
in the general welfare. Finally, Schmidt's conception of the business-
man whose desire to be a good citizen supersedes his desire for
profits was at odds with the economist's picture of the pure entre-
preneur so lovingly portrayed by Viner. Yet it is certainly clear that
the entrepreneur is not simply a calculating machine but a man of
flesh, blood, and ego who reacts to social as well as to economic
pressures.
Through these hazards of terminology and thought the Confer-
ence waded toward a clarification of the problem. Certainly no
clear-cut answer was achieved to the question: Can the effort to
regularize business investment contribute materially to economic
stabilization? The major achievement was a clarification as to what
further information was required and what the fruitful approaches
both to obtaining the information and to devising lines of attack on
the problem might be.
As to the lines of attack, three kept reappearing in the discussions:
(1) One was education: business decisions may be based in part on
erroneous thinking—errors that can be discovered and pointed out.
There may be a lag in the incorporation of the changing business
environment—in this instance, a basically more stable economic
milieu for the future than has been characteristic of the past—in the
structure of investment decisions; and the notion of public advan-
tage may be one that can be introduced into investment decisions
where such introduction is relatively costless. (2) Financial induce-
ments through change in tax laws and other methods may shift
supply and demand schedules in an advantageous fashion. (8) The
financing problems that inhibit investment in bad times may be
subject to amelioration.
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I would like to try to summarize a little more concretely just how
these various approaches seemed hopeful. We can start with the
negative case, as put with clarity and force by Joel Dean. He
visualized a demand curve for investment goods as consisting, in
effect, of a ranking of investment projects with respect to their
expected rate of return. The "cut-off point" on the curve is deter-
mined by the intersection of the supply curve. This curve he viewed
as a vertical line for firms in which funds were supplied from
internal sources. When recourse to external funds was envisaged,
the curve was flat with an upward hook somewhere along the line.
The cyclical pattern of investment Dean viewed as due primarily
to severe shifts in both the demand and suppiy curves during pros-
perity and depression. These shifts he considered "deep-rooted and
inescapable." Yet, as Arthur Burns pointed out, there actually has
been a great deal of depression investment undertaken and certainly
Dean's formulation comprehends this fact. Hastay's summary of
interindustry differences in investment demonstrated the varying
impact of cyclical shifts on businesses in which institutional and
other factors differed. Healy pointed out some very interesting
examples in the railroad industry in which large investments that
proved to be very advantageous were undertaken in depression
periods. Is it possible, then, through the three approaches that we
have just mentioned, to increase the amount of investment under-
taken in periods of slack business?
To return to Dean's formulation: for one thing, implicit in much
that was said during the Conference was the thought that both
supply and demand curves should be drawn not with a sharp pencil
but with a broad, flat brush. The point is that uncertainties with
respect to matters intimately connected with a proper investment
decision are such as to produce an area of essential unknowableness
in the advantage to be expected from a given expenditure. Healy
mentioned one dramatic example where a very large order for
locomotives was simply doubled in the course of a very few minutes'
discussion. It seems possible that, within this band of true indeter-
minacy, education with respect to public advantage might replace
a frail whim with respect to possible business advantage.
A second difficulty with Dean's formulation appeared, again
implicitly, in the notion that the actual constitution of the demand
curve for capital equipment might change in prosperity and depres-
sion. A given specific investment might move up in rank during
depression. This might apply to many sorts of delayed maintenance
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work that could be performed by members of the staff so that the
work would serve to keep the company organization intact. It would
be true likewise, of work in which installation produced severe
disruption in usual production schedules. Another example is in-
vestment resulting in important product improvement where the
cost might be partly thought of as a substitute for advertising
expense. A similar notion applies to investment that will permit a
firm to get the "jump" on its rivals.
Certainly, however, the matters of how demand and supply curves
shift with business conditions and how these shifts may be reduced
constitute the meat of the problem. Without trying to be systematic
I shall list a few thoughts that appeared in one or more of the papers.
The demand curve. Perhaps the foremost reason for the shift is
the fact that it seems disadvantageous to invest new money in a
plant that is not being fully utilized, even with respect to its more
or less first-line capacity. This difiiculty typically applies to so-called
replacement expenditures, but it also applies to plant expansion
because the replacement of a machine or a bank of machines by
currently available new equipment will usually involve an expan-
sion in capacity as well as replacement of old with new, lower-cost
capacity. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that most industrial
equipment will be expected to last at least ten years, the period of
underutilization must be assumed to be temporary. The "time dis-
count" on expected earnings may therefore be unrealistically high—
an area in which education might he useful. In other words, it may
be foolish to calculate the earnings or the pay-out period on the
basis primarily of current rate of operation. As companion piece to
these errors of pessimism, there may well be errors of optimism
during good times. Dean pointed out errors of this sort associated
with high price levels and current output rates and the assumption
that they will continue. Errors of a specific sort may be reinforced
by general pessimism or optimism, which, in a sense, is built into
a large management organization by the promulgation of such ideas
as "it isn't cricket to ask for appropriations in bad times." The
carrying cost of depression-built facilities until the time when they
may be utilized is a cost that might conceivably be lessened by
changing provisions with respect to tax carry-back.
Possible blind alleys. Schmidt, developing the indirect approach
to regularization, told of various efforts by individual firms to reduce
cyclical swings in output. But virtually no evidence was adduced to
indicate how such regularization, were it achieved, would contribute
to reduced cyclical fluctuation in aggregate business. Fundamen-
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tally, the difficulty seems to be that consumer buying is limited by
consumer income, and the possibility of affecting, through the offer-
ing of more enticing goods, the amount that consumers buy in the
aggregate during depression seems virtually nil. Insofar as business-
men are the final buyers we are back at the matter of investment
stabilization.
The supply curve. Here, more was said on the subject of external
than of internal funds. The need to maintain stable dividends was
underscored as one reason why internal funds available for invest-
ment decreased sharply during depression. The decrease was greater
than indicated by the available cash, since a great deal of the inflow
of cash that occurs in many firms during depression is due to the
liquidation of receivables and inventories—funds likely to be ear-
marked for call only when business increases again. It is therefore
considered dangerous to sink these funds in durable equipment.
Uncertainty about the length of depression usually plays an impor-
tant part in underscoring conservative judgments; is it possible, then,
that if business became convinced that long severe depressions were
ruled out by other remedies, the suppiy curve for internal funds
would moderate its leftward shifts during depression?
As to external funds, the preference for equity as contrasted with
loan funds makes it difficult to secure money in depression. The
diilkulty may be regarded as a higher cost, but in general it seemed
more usually thought of in terms of simple unavailability of money.
This is an area in which more stable expectations might be of some
help. It is also one in which possible measures directed toward the
banking system or toward tax or other measures designed to lessen
the prejudice against bond financing might be of help.
The papers presented at the Conference raised questions of the
sort just outlined, but they were not able to answer them in the way
in which they needed to be answered—in quantitative terms. We
need to know the aggregate amount of capital investment the timing
of which might be partially freed from considerations bearing on
current business conditions or even tied to depressed conditions
(though the latter is less likely to occur and not really essential).
For this purpose a great deal of further study was indicated. Several
thoughts on the character of such studies appeared in the course of
formal and informal discussion. Industry studies in which intimate
knowledge of business problems could be combined with technical
competence and analysis, a characteristic perhaps most clearly
demonstrated in Healy's paper, might be carried out in several other
industries. Studies of specific investments during depression periods,
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in particular industrial finns, could be analyzed in detail to find out
the reasons, positive and negative, for passing some projects and
rejecting others. To obtain some insight into the signfficance of over-
all problems and the points of view of different management
organizations, it might be possible to select within a given industry
finns that had made substantial purchases during depression and
firms that had not, both groups to be otherwise as much alike as
possible. These two groups could be subjected to concrete study.
Finally, the use of hindsight in the examination of actual investment
undertakings might throw light on the wisdom of the ways in which
investment decisions were formulated. Gonzalez' paper had an in-
teresting comment on this subject.
Concrete studies of motives and actions, whether of the sort we
have mentioned or fashioned in some other way, might provide the
wherewithal for judging the extent to which the smoothing out of
investment would be feasible. Obviously, cyclical patterns in busi-
ness investment will always move with the cycle and a maximum
objective can be only that they should move materially less than
they have in the recent past.
To achieve this degree of regularization, this two-day discussion
emphasized first the need for "education"—the reexamination by
businessmen and economists of the true advantage in investment
undertaken at various stages of the cycle. The answer will probably
differ for various sorts of investments, various sorts of businesses,
and firms in various kinds of circumstances. It may be assumed that
investment decisions have not been made faultlessly in the past; and
there will probably be points where more regular timing of invest-
ment would improve profits in either the short or the long run, or
where, in the face of inescapable areas of ignorance, furtherance of
the public interest would be relatively costless to even a single firm
(let alone to many firms acting together). Second, study is required
to learn the precise points at which public measures might aid in
weighting business judgments in salutary directions. The measures
envisaged were primarily change in tax laws and in capital markets.
Finally, it seemed clear that the investment approach at best could
be only one of a battery of actions directed toward lessening busi-
ness fluctuations and furthering economic development. Effective
action in these other directions would further the objective of lessen-
ing fluctuation in investment, and the investment attack would in
turn limit the scale, and thus increase the feasibility, of the other
approaches.
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